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REPLY TO APPELLEE'S PERTINENT STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Rigby claims in her Statement of the Case that, "The Court of Appeals should 
dismiss this appeal due to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce supporting the trial record of analyzing the income, expenses, needs and 
equitable concerns, including the length of the marriage and Petitioner's contempt of 
court." 
Ms. Rigby submits as Addendum A to her brief the Memorandum Decision of the 
Court signed by Judge Adkins on May 2, 2005. It is important to note that the trial was 
heard by Judge Adkins on April 27, 2005 and that just five days later Judge Adkins then 
prepared the Memorandum Decision signed on May 2, 2005 and mailed to the parties on 
May 4,2005 (please see Memorandum Decision at Addendum A and transcript pages 223 
- 241). These details are important because it seems as though the case was fresh in 
Judge Adkins' mind and in writing the Memorandum Decision, there are only 13 Findings 
of Fact that the trial judge specifically found that were stated in his Memorandum Decision. 
In the initial paragraph of his Memorandum Decision, the Judge said, "This matter came 
before the Court on April 27, 2005. The Court having taken the matter under advisement, 
now finds and rules as follows..." There were only 13 Findings by the Trial Court after 4 
1/4 hours of trial, witnesses and testimony. However, these limited Findings are crucial 
because Appellant is basing a majority of his case on the insufficiency of the Findings and 
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that the Findings did not support the Trial Court's decision to award alimony, orders of 
contempt, and other issues outlined in Appellant's initial brief. 
The limited Findings of the Trial Court written in the Memorandum Decision include 
the following: 
1. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction of this matter, and that both the 
Petitioner and the Respondent have established grounds for a divorce based on 
irreconcilable differences...; 
2. The parties' personal property has been divided since their separation... Mrs. 
Rigby has possession of the Oldsmobile vehicle and Mr. Rigby has the Chevrolet truck..., 
3. The parties own a home at 6993 Lochness Avenue in West Valley City, Utah, 
with a value of approximate $100,000 to $105,000 in its present condition... The legal 
description of said real property is Lot 32 Glen Heather # 1 Subdivision; 
4. There is a mortgage on the home with an outstanding balance of $76,405.14 
as of March, 2005. After payment of realtor fees and other expenses owed against the 
home, there should be approximately $18,000 to $19,000 that the parties will receive from 
the sale; 
•5. Mr. Rigby has the following income per month: $1,180 (gross) Granite School 
District/$776 (net) Federal Pension and Mrs. Rigby has gross monthly income of $1,670; 
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6. At the present time, Mr. Rigby has monthly income that is approximately $300 
a month more than Mrs. Rigby. Based upon these figures, the Court will allow alimony to 
Mrs. Rigby in the amount of $125 a month beginning May, 2005...; 
7. Mrs. Rigby should be awarded a monthly survivor annuity to commence upon 
Mr. Rigby's death to the maximum extent permitted by law; and Mrs. Rigby has future 
retirement benefits from her employment with First Security Bank and Wells Fargo Bank; 
8. Mr. Rigby has health insurance through his federal retirement. Mrs. Rigby 
may be able to obtain health coverage as a former spouse; 
9. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of 
the Order (accounting for his 401 (k))* has been deceptive in his responses and 
intentionally failed to comply; 
10. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of 
the Order (accounting for cash value of his life insurance policy)* but intentionally failed 
to comply; 
11. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply with that portion of 
the Order (written accounting for personal property)* but intentionally failed to comply; 
12. Mr. Rigby removed Mrs. Rigby from his Federal health insurance coverage 
in approximately January, 2004. The Court finds that Mr. Rigby had the ability to comply 
with that portion of the Order, but intentionally refused to comply; 
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13. Mr. Rigby's recalcitrance caused Mrs. Rigby to incur additional attorney fees. 
As a sanction for contempt, the Court would ordinarily impose an award of attorney fees 
against Mr. Rigby. However, the Court believes, that because of the financial condition 
of the parties, that a better sanction is to award Mrs. Rigby a greater portion of the sales 
proceeds from the home. 
Keeping in mind that there are only 13 findings, the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
in the case of Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986) that, "The findings of fact 
must show that the court's judgment or decree flows logically from and is supported by the 
evidence." Further, the Supreme Court stated in Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987) that, "The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Ms. Rigby's contention is that the Findings and Decree support the trial record 
with the Court analyzing the various issues. Mr. Rigby contends that the limited Findings 
and Conclusions are not sufficiently detailed and they do not include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps which the Court relied on to make its decision. 
It must also be noted that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
somewhat different from the Memorandum Decision and that the actual Findings and 
Decree were signed by Judge Deno Himonas and not Judge Adkins due to Judge Adkins' 
reassignment to the West Jordan Court shortly after signing the Memorandum Decision. 
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REPLY TO APPELLEE'S PERTINENT STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ms. Rigby admits at paragraph no. 2 of her Statement of the Facts that, "Although 
there is not a sub-paragraph denoted specifically toward the actual expenses of the 
parties, the District Court Judge calculated the expenses and subtracted them from the 
parties' respective incomes and formulated the alimony award as outlined in the sub-
section entitled 'Alimony.'" This is an admission that there were no Findings of Fact in 
relation to the parties' actual expenses! The statement of Ms. Rigby that the trial Judge 
calculated the actual expenses and subtracted them from the parties' respective incomes 
is simply speculative. The bottom line is that one is left to wonder if there were 
calculations and if there were calculations, what were the actual expenses? What weight 
was placed on the various testimony and evidence received by the Court? If Judge Adkins 
subtracted the actual expenses from the parties' incomes, what were his findings? 
Ultimately, since Judge Adkins seemingly equalized the parties' income, one is left to 
wonder if there were any calculations of actual expenses whatsoever and whether there 
were any actual expenses subtracted from the parties' respective incomes. Even when 
coming up with the equalization of income order of $125 per month, the Court did not 
property take into account the actual net monthly incomes of the parties or the lion's share 
of the debt load that was charged to Mr. Rigby. In fact, the Court ordered additional debt 
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with its decision regarding its order of how to handle the monthly survivor annuity issue 
which it assigned to Mr. Rigby and thus became additional debt. 
Ms. Rigby further expects the Appellate Court to take a "leap of faith" with her 
statement in the third paragraph of the Statement of Facts wherein she claims, "Expenses 
were thoroughly discussed and was an integral part of formulating the alimony award as 
outlined in the trial record." One is left to wonder why there were no literal Findings of the 
Trial Court in relation to the parties' monthly expenses and since the Trial Court ordered 
alimony based on equalization of income, how Ms. Rigby can claim that in the formation 
of the alimony award, the Court intricately reviewed and discussed the expenses of the 
parties. If the Court is concerned that the $125 per month amount reached by the Trial 
Court is a modest amount, the Court must also consider that the literal implementation of 
this Order creates a possible $50,000 debt to Mr. Rigby if he pays alimony at $125 per 
month for as long as the parties were married. This amount should not go unnoticed. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985) that, "Three factors have long been considered, and must always be considered 
before awarding alimony: (1) the financial needs and condition of the recipient's spouse; 
(2) the ability of the recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for himself or herself; 
and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." This was reaffirmed in the Utah 
Supreme Court's case of Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1998). Ms. Rigby 
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seems to rest a majority of her case on the Utah Court of Appeal's case of Haumont v. 
Haumont 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App1990) wherein the Court stated, "If the Trial 
Court considers these factors in setting an award of alimony, we will not disturb its award 
absence a showing that such a serious inequality has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." A literal reading of this case then becomes an issue of how one can 
determine if the Trial Court "considers" certain factors. Just because the Trial Court heard 
evidence or admits a financial declaration into evidence, is that proof that the Court has 
considered issues? The only way to know if the Court has considered certain facts is if 
there is some specific finding. The Court has stated in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 
(Utah Ct. App1990) that, "Where a trial Court fails to enter specific findings on the needs 
and condition of the recipient spouse, making effective review of the alimony award 
impossible, that omission is an abuse of discretion." The Court failed to calculate or make 
any finding regarding the needs and conditions of Ms. Rigby. The Court summarily 
entered an order of alimony based upon equalization of income. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S SUMMARY AND ARGUMENTS 
Ms. Rigby's question to the Court in her brief under the section of Summary and 
Argument poses the question, "Are the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce sufficient in analyzing the parties' income, expenses, needs, and equitable 
concerns, such as the length of the marriage and contemptuous actions by the Petitioner, 
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to make an award of alimony which equalizes the parties' income?" Again, Ms. Rigby rests 
her case on Haumont wherein the Court stated, "In considering the above-listed factors, 
the Trial Court must make adequate factual findings on all material issues unless the facts 
in the record are clear, uncontroverted, incapable of supporting only a finding in favor of 
the judgment." JcL at 434. The problem with this analysis is that the Court did not enter 
specific Findings of Fact so one is left to wonder what exactly the Court relied on to come 
up with the equalization of income for alimony. Ms. Rigby stated at point 1 of page 17 of 
her brief that, "The Trial Court carefully considered the financial condition and needs of 
the receiving spouse." This is a statement is made without any facts to support it and there 
is absolutely no indication on the record or in the Findings that the Court made these 
considerations. 
Still at page 17, paragraph 1 Ms. Rigby requests that the court consider that, "Ms. 
Rigby had no disposable income after her expenses were subtracted from her income, and 
certainly could not afford a place to live." The Court gave absolutely no indication of 
whether it adopted either parties' financial declaration. The statement that the Court 
"considered" Ms. Rigby to have no disposable income cannot be found anywhere on the 
record or in the Findings. Ms. Rigby gives us another indicator of the speculation she is 
asking this Court to consider by stating in the second full paragraph of point 1 at page 17 
that, "The Court did not outline the math calculation in the Memorandum Decision or the 
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signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law..." Again, these are admissions by Ms. 
Rigby that there were no calculations made by the Trial Court. Further, she states in the 
same paragraph that, "...the Trial Court record reflects that the Court came to these figures 
by carefully considering the income and expenses of the parties and their disposable 
income." There is absolutely no indication on the record or in the Findings that the Court 
carefully considered the income and expenses of the parties and their disposable income 
as Ms. Rigby is claiming. The question must be asked, did the Court carefully consider 
the income and expenses of the parties? Is mere consideration enough? Can the Court 
magically transform possible considerations into the creation of a record that is "clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgment" as was 
stated in Haumont? 
The claim that Mr. Rigby had more disposable income than Ms. Rigby is also 
problematic because there was no specific finding of the disposable income for either 
party. Mr. Rigby's income at Granite School District was a gross monthly income figure 
as was Ms. Rigby's income. Mr. Rigby's federal pension income was a net figure so two 
of the three incomes used were gross incomes, therefore, the claim for disposable income 
is incorrect. The Utah Court of Appeals encountered the same problems as identified by 
Mr. Rigby in the case of Bakanowski v. Bakanowski. 80 P.3d 153, 2003 UT App 357 
wherein the Court stated, "Here, the Trial Court never determined wife's needs based on 
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the parties' historical standing of living. Instead, the Trial Court engaged in an effort to 
simply equalize income. In attempting to equalize the parties' incomes, rather than going 
through the traditional needs analysis, the Trial Court abused its discretion." Additionally, 
the Bakanowski Court quoted the Utah Supreme Court in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987) wherein the Court stated, "The absence of Findings of Fact is a 
fundamental defect that makes it impossible to review the issues that were briefed without 
invading the Trial Court's fact finding domain." The Trial Court was overturned in 
Bakanowski because, "The Trial Court found wife's monthly living expenses to be inflated, 
and then explicitly avoided evaluating her monthly needs and her independent ability to 
meet those needs. We therefore remand the case so that the Trial Court may enter 
appropriate Findings." ]d at 156. Further, the Court stated in Davis that, "As long as the 
Trial Court exercises its discretion within the bounds and under the standards we have set 
and have supported its decision with adequate Findings and Conclusions, we will not 
disturb its ruling." Jd at 649. 
At Point 3 of Ms. Rigby's brief at page 18, the statement is made, "The Trial Court 
carefully weighed the ability of the responding spouse to provide support." There is 
absolutely no Findings or Conclusions to support the statement that the Trial Court 
carefully weighed this issue. Further, Ms. Rigby states in Point 3 that, "The 
Court...calculated that after expenses, Mr. Rigby would have $300 in disposable dollars." 
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Once again, the Court made absolutely no calculation that is in the Memorandum Decision 
or in the Findings and the claim that the Court calculated that "after expenses" Mr. Rigby 
would have $300 in disposable dollars is nowhere to be found. Ms. Rigby makes her third 
admission of insufficiency at page 19 of her brief in the first full paragraph stating, "Even 
if the Trial Court did not show the calculations in its Memorandum Decision, or in the 
Findings of Fact, clearly the record before the Court bares out that there was not a clear 
abuse of discretion." 
REPLY TO COURT'S FINDING OF CONTEMPT AGAINST MR. RIGBY 
Ms. Rigby has cited In re: Cannetella. 2006 P.3d 89 (UT Ct. App March, 2006) 
stating, "In order to prove contempt for failure to comply with the court order, it must be 
shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to 
comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so." Cannetella tracks with Van Hake v. 
Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) as was cited by Mr. Rigby. Ms. Rigby fails to respond 
to the specific challenge to this finding of contempt as put forth in Mr. Rigby's appeal brief, 
wherein Mr. Rigby quotes Van Hake stating, "The Trial Court must enter written Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law with respect to each of the substantive elements." Mr. 
Rigby was found in contempt by the Trial Court of four separate contempts. A thorough 
review of the Findings show that in each of the four findings of contempt, that the Court 
only dealt with the later two requirements which allow the Court to make a finding of 
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contempt. The Court did not annunciate or deal with the first requirement which required 
a Court finding that the individual knew of the specific order of the Court. Under the Van 
Hake test or even under Cannetella, the Court has once again not sufficiently put forth 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which would allow entry of a finding of contempt. 
Therefore, the previous findings of contempt against Mr. Rigby must be dismissed 
which throws huge implications on how the Trial Court handled the equity issue in the 
martial home as well as attorney fees. Ms. Rigby's lengthy analysis in her brief does not 
deal with this issue of insufficient Findings regarding Mr. Rigby's knowledge of the specific 
orders of the Court. 
Finally, there is absolutely no mention by the Trial Court of the standard of proof 
necessary to enter a finding of contempt. This heightened standard of clear and 
convincing proof was not dealt with or considered by the Trial Court. Therefore, the Trial 
Court's finding of the various contempts must be overturned. 
REPLY TO CLAIM OF FAILURE TO MARSHALL EVIDENCE 
The claim that Mr. Rigby has not marshaled the evidence misses the mark because 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as outlined in the Memorandum Decision and 
in the final documents are so deficient that one is not certain what considerations, if any, 
the Court made regarding the evidence and trial testimony. This is the reason that Mr. 
Rigby outlined the very few literal Findings of the Trial Court. As has already been 
14 
outlined, Ms. Rigby's brief admits to the numerous deficiencies. She states at page 12, 
last partial paragraph, "Although there is not a subparagraph denoted specifically toward 
the actual expenses of the parties..." She admits at page 17 in the third full paragraph 
that, "Although the Court did not outline the math calculations in the Memorandum 
Decision or the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law..." Additionally, she stated at 
page 19 in the first full paragraph that, "Even if the Trial Court did not show the 
calculations..." This is proof that the Memorandum Decision, Findings, and Decree were 
severely deficient and it is difficult to marshal evidence that is simply not there or that the 
finder of fact must speculate as to the real considerations of the Trial Court. The caselaw 
identified mandates that the Court enter specific Findings in relation to income, needs, 
expenses, debts, and all other financial data. Further, for the Court to enter a finding of 
contempt, certain specific findings must be analyzed and entered by the Court. The Court 
Memorandum, Findings, and Decree are all deficient in these areas. 
Therefore, the Findings and Decree of the Trial Court must be overturned. 
DATED this / T " day of M/hU 2006. 
David J Friel 
Attorney for Appellant 
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